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Summary  findings
A systemic financial crisis with  monetary restriction is  *  The drop in credit lines-arguably  a proxy
probably the most promising occasion for assessing  identifying shifts in the loan supply-is  larger for firms
whether and to what extent relationship banking is  relying less on strong relationship banking.
valuable to borrowers. Ferri, Kang, and Kim take this  *  More intense pre-crisis relationship banking reduces
question to a unique database of credit bureau  the probability that a previously nondelinquent  firm
microeconomic information covering the pervasive  would build (increase) its loans in arrears in 1998, the
financial crisis the Republic of Korea experienced in  year of the sharpest liquidity constraints.
1997-98.  *  All things equal, this probability depends on
The database includes all corporate borrowers  whether firms were borrowing from one (or more) of the
surveyed by the Korean Credit Bureau, providing details  five banks foreclosed in June  1998, showing that it might
on the structure of their borrowings and on their  be particularly difficult for borrowers to replace
relationship with lending banks. The authors did not  distressed lending banks during a financial crisis.
have access to the identity of the corporate borrower and  The authors'  findings support the hypothesis that
their only nonfinancial control variable was the  relationship banking-with  surviving banks-has  a
borrower's  Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). This  positive value during a systemic financial crisis. They
restriction limited their analysis to smaller borrowers,  argue that for many viable small and medium-size
keeping their sample focused on small and medium-size  businesses in Korea, relationship banking reduced
enterprises, which were likely to rely on banks for  liquidity constraints and thus diminished the probability
external financing. Their findings:  of unwarranted bankruptcy.
* Outstanding loans plunge more for firms with
weaker pre-crisis relationship banking.
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The impact of relationship banking has spawned a vivid debate over the recent years as
the theory of financial  internediation  has  come to  rely on information asymmetries and the
associated  agency  problems  between  lenders  and  borrowers,  potentially  leading  to  credit
constraints for borrowers (Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993).  On one side, some authors hold that
relationship banking -based  on  close bank-firm customer relationships-  helps  overcome such
information  asymmetries,  thus  benefiting  lenders  while  reducing  for  borrowers  both  credit
rationing  and the cost of credit  (Diamond, 1984 and  1989; Boot and Thakor, 1994).  On the
opposite side, others stress the perils of relationship banking:  i) it can create misallocation due to
soft-budget constraints, as borrowers -expecting  to be better able to renegotiate their loans ex
post with a relationship lender-  have little ex ante incentive to boost their effort (Bolton and
Scharfstein, 1996);  ii) it may generate lender's  rent extraction from the borrower -because  the
latter is  informnationally  captured  by the former - and, thus, not  necessarily  bring  about the
previously envisaged reduction in credit constraints for borrowers (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992;
Weinstein and Yafeh,  1999).  Although evidence has been offered supporting alternatively the
former or the latter view, the state of the art is still unsatisfactory, calling for new efforts to test
empirically the impact of relationship banking (Boot, 2000).
The aim of this paper is to shed new light on this debate.  Our contribution is based on: (i)
a unique event and (ii) a very special database.  First, the unique event is the experience of Korea
during  1997-98, when  the  sharp  exchange  rate  collapse  and  the  associated  circumstances
triggered a severe monetary tightening and a pervasive financial crisis with extensive distress in
both the  corporate and  banking sectors.  Indeed, a  systemic  financial crisis  seems  the most
promising  event  to  assess  whether and  to  what  extent  relationship  banking  is  valuable  to
2borrowers.  Under such circumstances of generalized liquidity constraints, relationship banking
may secure access to external finance for firms and, thus, help them better weather the crisis.
Nevertheless,  relationship  banking  might  turn  from  good  to  bad  if  it happens  to  associate
borrowers with distressed lenders, namely that firms suffer from accessing to credit when their
banks -firms'  relationship lenders-  are  experiencing difficulties  (Diamond, 2000;  Kang  and
Stulz, 1997).
Second, the very  special database  comprises credit bureau micro-informnation  covering
the period of the event.  Specifically, our database includes all corporate borrowers compiled by
the  Korean  Credit Bureau,  for which  we  observe  the following  information:  (i)  total  loans
outstanding; (ii) amount of collateral; (iii) loans in arrears; (iv) number of lending banks and
amount of loans outstanding with each of them; (v) credit lines; (vi) SIC industrial code; (vii)
whether the firm was borrowing from one (or more) of the five banks foreclosed in June 1998.
Although its details on credit relations make our database ideal to evaluate the impact of
relationship banking, wo still face some  shortcomings.  In the first  place, the Korean  Credit
Bureau does not collect information on bank lending rates.  Accordingly, we cannot assess the
impact of relationship banking in terms of the cost of credit and we can only focus on variables
associated  with  the availability  of  credit.  Secondly, given our  data, we  can  only  measure
relationship banking along one of its two dimensions -namely  the intensity of the relationship in
terms of the concentration of the loans supplied to the firm- while we cannot observe the other
dimension -the  length of the relationship.  Thirdly, because of comprehensible restrictions, we
don't  have access to the identity of the corporate borrower.  Thus, we have no way to control for
balance sheet and profit/loss accounts information on borrowers and the only available control
variable is the firm's  SIC industrial code.  In the light of this restriction, we limit our analysis
3only  to  those  firms  whose  total  loans  outstanding  lie  below  one  billion  Korean  Won
(approximately $830,000 at the post-crisis exchange rate) to exclude from the sample medium-
large sized firms with likely access to financial markets and keep the sample focused on a more
homogeneous set of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
Our econometric analysis tests whether proxies for the intensity of relationship banking
turn out to be determinants of the availability of credit for firms in our sample during the crisis.
Specifically, we  estimate  three  equations  on  the  determinants  of:  (i)  the  changes  in  loans
outstanding; (ii) the  changes in credit limits  granted by banks -arguably  a proxy  identifying
shifts  in  the  loan  supply-  to  borrowing  firms;  (iii)  the  probability  that  a  previously  non-
delinquent firm will build (increase her)  loans in  arrears in  1998, the year of the sharpest  1
iquidity constraints.
We reach four main findings.  First, outstanding loans plunge more for firms with weaker
pre-crisis relationship banking.  Second, also the drop in credit lines is larger for firms relying
less on strong relationship banking.  Third, more intense pre-crisis relationship banking reduces
the probability that a previously non-delinquent firm will build (increase her) loans in arrears in
1998, the year of the sharpest liquidity constraints.  Fourth, ceteris paribus, the aforementioned
probability depends on whether firms were  borrowing from one  (or more) of the five banks
foreclosed in June 1998, testifying that it may be particularly difficult for borrowers to substitute
distressed lending banks during a financial crisis.
Overall, our findings  support the hypothesis that relationship banking -with  surviving
banks-  has a positive value during a systemic financial crisis, reducing liquidity constraints for
borrowers,  although we  cannot exclude  -since  we  don't  observe  lending rates-  that  it also
implies  rent extraction.  We argue that  for many viable  Korean  SMEs  relationship banking
4reduced the extent of liquidity constraints  and, thus, diminished  the probability  of unwarranted
bankruptcy.
The rest of the paper is organized  as follows. Section  2 discusses  in more detail why we
expect  that relationship  banking is most valuable  to borrowers  during financial  crises. Section 3
provides a quick refresher on the main features of the Korean financial crisis.  Section 4
describes  the data we use, documents the variables employed and presents the results of the
regressions. Section  5 concludes.
2  Why  relationship  banking  is most  valuable  during  financial  crises
We will first provide a brief review of the arguments  and evidence  in favor and against
relationship  banking. Then we will concisely  focus on the debate concerning  a specific  feature
of bank-firm  relationships  -namely, the extent of multiple banking relationships- that will be
particularly important in our empirical analysis.  Finally, we will stretch the discussion on
relationship  banking  to a situation  of financial  crisis.
It is well known that information  asymmetries  between the borrower and the lender -
whereby the latter doesn't have full visibility on the quality of the former- may engender
quantity constraints  for the borrower faces in her access to bank finance (Stiglitz and Weiss,
1981). The main implication  of relationship  banking  is exactly  that -by establishing  an intense
relationship  with the borrower- banks may be able to reduce the extent of such information
asymmetries  and, thus, diminish  credit  constraints  for the borrower.
According  to Boot (2000), relationship  banking centers around two critical dimensions:
the extraction  of proprietary  information  from the borrower  by the lender and the occurrence  of
multiple interactions  between the two parties. As such, relationship  banking  may be defined as
5"the  provision  of financial  services by  a  financial intermediary  that:  i.  invests  in  obtaining
customer-specific information, often proprietary in nature; and ii. evaluates the profitability of
these investments through multiple interactions with the same customer over time and/or across
products".  This  special  status  can  facilitate  a  Pareto-improving  exchange  of  information
between the borrower and the bank.  But relationship banking can also add value through several
additional contractual welfare-improving enhancements:  i) through flexibility and discretion, it
can facilitate implicit long term contracting;  ii) it may help controlling potential conflicts of
interest;  iii) it can improve the monitoring of collateral;  iv) it may render feasible for the bank
to  make  loans that  would not  be  profitable from  a  short term perspective but  may become
profitable if the relationship with the borrower lasts long enough.
Nevertheless,  there  are  also  two  main  potential  perils  associated  with  relationship
banking.  First,  misallocation may  arise due  to  the  soft-budget  constraint  problem.  Since
borrowers realize  ex  ante that  it should be  easy to  renegotiate their  loans  ex  post  with the
relationship lender, they have little ex ante incentive to boost their effort (Bolton and Scharfstein,
1996).  Second, the lender extracts rent from the borrower because of the hold-up problem.  As
the borrower becomes informationally captured by the lender, the latter may be able apply unfair
credit terms.  In such a case, it could turn out that relationship banking does not necessarily bring
about the previously  envisaged  reduction  in  credit  constraints for  borrowers  (Sharpe,  1990;
Rajan, 1992; Weinstein and Yafeh, 1999).
Many researchers  have endeavored to  assess empirically which of the two  alternative
views carries out to the data.  For the sake of brevity, we will limit our review to some recent
papers.
6Various papers have analyzed the impact of relationship banking on small firm financing
in several countries.  Numerous studies on the United States have used data from the National
Survey of Small Business Finance.  Petersen and Rajan (1994) show that firms borrowing from
fewer banks, enjoy easier access to bank credit and lower interest rates, while longer borrowing
relationships enhance credit availability.  Petersen and Rajan (1995) find that bank lending rates
for  younger  firms  are  lower  in  less  competitive  markets,  where  -supposedly-  relationship
banking can more easily be sustained."  Berger and Udell (1995) show that long-standing bank
relationships reduce  for firms  both the cost  of bank  borrowing  and the  associated  collateral
requirements -on  previously negotiated credit lines.  On US data drawn from the 1995 Credit,
Banks and Small Business survey,  Scott (2000) evinces that low account manager turnover and
frequent social  contact with  the  owner of  the  firm -by  strengthening  relationship  banking-
significantly benefit borrowers in terms of both credit availability and loan pricing.  Referring to
Japan,  Weinstein  and  Yafeh  (1999) find  that  strong  links  to  borrowers  permit  main  banks
significant  rent  extraction  through  higher-than-average  lending  rates.  Regarding  Germany,
Elsas, and Krahnen  (1998) -using  banks'  internal credit  file data-  concur with  Harhoff, and
Korting (1998) -using  survey data-  that the main impact of relationship banking is on credit
availability rather than loan pricing.  Using survey data for Italy, Angelini, Di Salvo, and Ferri
(1998) find that relationship banking reduces credit rationing, but lending rates tend to increase
with the length of the relationship. Finally, for Belgian firms, Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000)
detect  conflicting  impacts  of  two  different  dimensions  of  relationship  banking:  loan  rates
increase with the duration of a bank-firm relationship, while the scope of a relationship -defined
7as  the  purchase  of  other  information-sensitive  products  from  a  bank-  reduces  loan  rates
substantially.
As it is clear by now, one may assess the intensity of relationship banking along several
dimensions, all of which  affecting bank/borrower incentives and the bank's  ability to  extract
proprietary information:  i) the duration of the bank-borrower relationship;  ii) the scope of the
relationship  -whereby  the  borrower  may  acquire  from  a  bank  other  information-sensitive
products  beside  the  loan;  iii)  the  extent  of  multiple-bank  -as  opposed  to  main-bank-
relationships.  Considerable  debate  has  emerged  along this  third  dimension  of  relationship
banking.  On one  hand,  Detragiache, Garella,  and  Guiso (2000) propose  a model  in  which
relationship banks may be unable to continue funding profitable projects and multiple banking
emerges as an optimal solution to reduce the probability of inefficient early liquidation; they also
offer  supporting empirical  evidence.2 On  the other  hand,  various  papers  present  empirical
evidence according to which multiple banking may reduce the availability of credit to borrowers.
Cole (1998) finds that a lender is less likely to grant credit to a firm if the firm deals with other
financial counterparts.  Angelini,  Di  Salvo,  and Ferri  (1998) show  that,  ceteris paribus,  the
reported intensity of credit rationing increases with the number of lending banks.  Analyzing the
duration of bank-firm relations in Portugal, Farinha, and Santos (2000) conclude that multiple
banking emerges because of the unwillingness by the incumbent bank to increase its exposure to
poor performing firms rather than because high-growth firms seek to protect themselves against
the hold-up rents inherent to exclusive relationships. 3
This brief review of the extant literature suffices to show how the belief that relationship
banking adds value to the economy is widely, but not  unanimously, accepted.  Nevertheless,
8even if  we accept that  relationship banking does add value, why should  it be  most valuable
during financial crises?
The  answer  depends  on  the  fact  that  during  financial  crises  economies  experience
widespread distress.  This implies that borrowers need financial assistance most exactly when the
economy is plundered by pervasive lack of liquidity.  If this financial assistance is denied, many
viable  firms might become insolvent and  become bankrupt, with large potential depletion  of
corporate value (Andrade and Kaplan, 1998). What is then the link between relationship banking
and distress?  Luckily, here we have a rather general agreement that relationship banking may
help deal with financial distress.
Analyzing the case of Japanese firms, Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990) show that
the costs borne  to  overcome  episodes  of financial  distress  are significantly  lower  for  firms
enjoying long-standing relationships with a main bank.  Kawai, Hashimoto, and Izumida (1996)
find that the main bank system reduces the firm's  financial cost for Japanese firms in financial
distress. 4 Elsas and Krahnen (1998) reach analogous conclusions on German data: they unveil
that housebanks provide liquidity insurance in situations of unexpected deterioration of borrower
ratings.  Building on the hypothesis that implicit contracts may characterize bank lending (Fried
and Howitt, 1980), Berlin, and Mester (1998) find evidence that relationship banks smooth loan
rates in response to exogenous shocks.  They argue that loan rate smoothing is part of an optimal
long-term contract between a  bank and its borrower if  it happens  in response to interest rate
shocks -but  not in response to a credit risk. 5 Examining micro-data on corporate borrowing in
Italy  during  the  episode  of  sharp  monetary  tightening  in  1992 -aimed  to  resist  the  extant
exchange rate crisis-  Conigliani, Ferri, and Generale (1997) show that the intensity of lending
rate increase and of credit constraints was higher the larger the number of lending banks.
9While there is general consensus that relationship  banking should be most valuable
during financial  crises,  we need  to make an important  caveat. Specifically,  as Berlin,  and Mester
(1998) also show, loan rate smoothing  -and, we can add, the provision of liquidity insurance
more in general- reduces bank profits. This means that financial  crises may impose a greater
burden  on relationship  banks than on arm's length banks. If one considers  that such a burden is
compounded  with the accrual of increasing  losses triggered by the crisis, this entails that the
stability of (some) relationship  banks may be at risk.  In other words, there is a limit to the
intertemporal  smoothing  and liquidity insurance  offered by relationship  banks.  And, in some
cases,  relationship  banks may  become  distressed. Should  such occurrence  materialize,  borrowers
would be hit by the curse of relationship  banking rather than enjoying  its benefits. In practice,
distressed  relationship  banks would be recalling  their loans and their borrowers might be the
least prepared  to deal with such a situation. It may, in fact, be rather difficult for borrowers  to
substitute  distressed  relationship  banks exactly  at the time of a financial  crisis. 6 Accordingly,  it
will be important  to control  for the various cases  of suspended  banks in our empirical  analysis.
3  A quick refresher  of the Korean  fmancial  crisis
The Korean crisis -together with the other episodes of East Asian crises- has been
studied  not only extensively  but also from many different  perspectives. 7 It is generally  held that
loss of confidence  in the Korean  economy  led to market reactions  which  went well beyond what
was justified by Korean imbalances. This over-reaction  by markets led to the unprecedented
currency  crisis. A twin banking  crisis unfolded as heavy losses mounted  on the large unhedged
foreign currency debt, as asset markets (stocks, real estate, and bonds) deteriorated, and as
domestic interest rates increased rapidly - in response to swift monetary restriction aimed at
restoring  market  confidence.
10The value of the Korean won in terms of U.S. dollar plummeted by more than 90 percent
between July and December of 1997: from 889.1 to  1695.0 Won/U$ (Figure  1).  A sharp drop
was also evident in the stock market: between August  1997 and August  1998 the composite
stock price index fell precipitously by 55% (Figure  1).  Tight monetary policy -aimed  to keep
the domestic currency  from  plunging in the midst  of the crisis-  raised market  interest rates
sharply.  The overnight inter-bank rate (call rate) rose from 11.4 percent in July  1997 to 25.3
percent in January 1998.  Long-term rates on risk-free Government bonds -National  housing
bonds (type 1) with 5 year maturity-  also raised up to  16.5 percent  from  11.2 percent for the
same period (Figure 2).  Figure 3 presents the evidence that bank-dependent borrowers -mostly
SMEs- were disproportionately hit by the credit crunch as could be expected on the basis of the
bank-lending channel hypothesis.
Altogether, the p!ummeting exchange rate, the sharp decline in the stock market and the
marked rise in interest rates had the very distinct effect of weakening both the banking system
and  the  corporate  secter,  as these  factors  damaged  banks'  and  firms'  balance  sheets.  For
8 instance, with a fast growing foreign currency debt,  an unexpected devaluation of the Korean
Won resulted in a declining net worth of firms and banks because of their widespread holding of
unhedged liabilities in foreign currency.  In turn, deteriorating balance sheets increased adverse
selection and moral hazard problems, which could lead to precipitous financial instability during
the Korean  crisis (Hahm and  Mishkin,  1999).  A sharp decline in the  stock market,  in fact,
reduces the market valuation of firms'  net worth, and can thus increase adverse selection and
moral hazard problems (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989).  Adverse selection is only made worse by
higher interest rates that increase the likelihood that the bank is lending to higher-risk borrowers
11(Stiglitz  and Weiss, 1981). Thereby  a rise in interest  rates  directly  decreases  banks' net worth by
cutting  down  the present  value of their assets.
It becomes  harder for banks to screen  out good from bad borrowers  when the decline  in
the net worth decreases the value of firm's collateral  and increases  firms' incentives  to make
risky investments  especially  in an environment  of prevailing  uncertainty  spawned  by information
asymmetries. Furthermore  capital shortages  in the banking sector, already stricken by a huge
amount of non-performing  loans, were likely to be further exacerbated  after the stiffening of
capital  adequacy  standards  enacted  by national  regulators  immediately  upon the inception  of the
crisis  in December  of 1997. Recent  research suggests  that this type of regulatory-induced  capital
crunch  caused  poorly capitalized  banks to contract their loans  markedly during the crisis period
in Korea (Ferri  and  Kang, 1999).
12Figure 1: Trend of Exchange rates and  Figure 2: Trend of Overnight Call rate and
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closing-down  and M&A  during 1998-1999  (Table 1)-judged non-viable  stood  at 335.
Table 1: Changes in the number of fmancial institutions during 1998-99
Number  of  1998  1999  Number  of
Institutions  Newly  Newly  Institutions
at the end  Exit 2)  Merger  established  Exit2)  Merger  established  at the end
of 1997')  of 19991)
*  Banks  33  5  3  - 2  - 23
*  Merchant
Banking  30  16  - - 1  3  - 10
Corporations
*  Securities
companies  36  6  I  - - 1  32
*  Investment
Trust  31  7  - I  - 23
Companies
. Insurance
companies  45  4  1  - - - - 40
*  Mutual
Savings  and  231  22  2  4  21  10  6  186
Finance
companies
*  Credit  1,666  69  14  9  103  45  - 1,444
Unions
Total  2,072  129  20  14  125  61  7  1,785
Source:  Quarterly  Review,  The  Bank of Korea.  (March,  2000).
1) Excluding  bridge  financial  institutions  and branches  of foreign  banks.
2) Including  revocation  of license,  bankruptcy,  liquidation.
3) Commercial  banks  (26)  and Specialized  banks  (7).
Since securities  markets in Korea are not as deep as in other  major countries  (particularly
in market-based  financial  systems:  Table2),  corporate  dependence  on indirect  financing such as
bank borrowing  is particularly  high in Korea (Table 3).  In principle,  thus, one can guess that
relationship banking may be more important in Korea than in  other countries with more
developed  financial  markets. In this regards, one could easily expect that both the massive  exit
of  distressed financial institutions and the  weakening of  banking sectors' balance sheets
engender  pervasive  and inexorable  liquidity constraint  for the corporate sector in the form of a
severe drop in credit (Figure 4).
14Table  2: Size of Stock Markets
(during 1997)  (Billion dollars)
Countries  Number of listed fmns  Stock market  Transaction volume  Capital increase
capitalization  During 1997
US  9,091  12,884.5  10,600.8  222.1
UK  2,513  1,996.2  1,989.5  22.3
Germany  2,696  825.2  1,067.7  8.9
Japan  3,140  2,216.7  1,117.9  9.5
Korea  776  41.9  170.8  3.2
Source:  "Stock",  Korea  Stock  Exchange  (July,  1998).
Table  3: Corporate  Financing  Structure  (Manufacturing  Industry)
(per cent)
1979-  1984-  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998
1983  1988
Internal Funds  26.7  43.7  46.4  31.3  33.5  42.1  51.4  41.9  44.2  34.0  22.0  22.0
External Funds  73.3  56.3  53.6  68.7  66.5  57.9  48.6  58.1  55.8  66.0  78.0  78.0
*  Direct Financing  13.8  14.0  14.4  15.6  14.8  10.4  17.9  11.9  9.1  16.8  11.7  4.0
1.  Stocks  7.1  8.4  7.2  5.4  3.8  4.9  6.0  3.6  3.2  3.5  1.6  1.6
2.  Bonds  6.7  5.6  7.2  10.2  11.0  5.6  12.0  8.3  5.8  13.3  10.1  2.4
*  Indirect Financing  29.6  20.5  20.4  31.8  30.4  36.2  17.8  19.5  27.7  37.9  52.0  59.6
Bank Borrowing  19.7  16.4  16.0  24.2  19.4  23.7  13.0  14.6  19.6  26.9  39.5  39.5
Source: "Financial  Statement  Analysis",  The  Bank of Korea (various  issues).
4  The empirical  analysis
4.1  Sample selection
We use data complied by the Credit Information Department (CID) in Korea Bankers
Association (the Korean Credit Bureau).  Credit information for those firms borrowing from any
bank is pooled into the CID and can be shared by all member banks.  Thus Bank A can monitor
the  lending  information  of Bank  B  for  a  specific firm  j.  Member banks  must  file  credit
information on borrowing firms with the CID in the event of making loans greater than .5 billion
15won (approximately $415,000 at the post-crisis exchange rate).  Once the initial loan is reported,
the CID maintains the credit record even in case the outstanding level falls below .5 billion won.
Table  4: Distribution  of loans  by size class
(Million  won)
Cumulative  number  of firms  Average  Loan  Size
(end  of 1995-
end  of 1999)
Up to l/lOth  1,530m  429.2
Up to 2/1Oth  3,060k'  661.6
Up  to 3/10th  4,590oh  906.4
Up to 4/1Oth  6,122h  1,204.8
Up to 5/10th  7,653h  1,604.8  (Median)
Up to 6/lOth  9,183t  2,130.6
Up to 7/10th  10,713t  2,923.8
Up  to 8/10th  12,244 ,h  4,467.0
* 7,326  (Mean)
Up to 9/10th  13,774h  9,346.0
Upto 10/10th  15,305'  5,573,076
Starting with 39,523 non-financial firms included in the CID database, we reduced the
sample to  15,305 firms by  excluding  those firms  for  which no  information on  lending was
available and by limiting the analysis to the firms continuously present in the records between
December  1995  and  December  1999.  In  addition,  in  order  to  focus  on  small-sized-loan
borrowers -most  of which are presumably SMEs-  we dropped large loans and kept only those
firms whose total loans were  below  1 billion won (approximately $830,000 at the post-crisis
exchange rate) up to  3/10t  from the bottom.  Thus the total number of observations dropped
from 15,305 to 4,590 firms (Table 4).
Research on the number of firms' banking relations finds that SMEs generally hold only
one relationship and that  the average number of relationship increases with  the firm's  size.9
Table 5 -displaying the average values during the period of 1995 through  1999, according to a
breakdown by classes of loan size, the number of borrowers in each class, the number of lending
16banks, and the Herfindahl index-l'  confirms that these patterns apply to  Korean firms too.
Small-total-loans  firms of the bottom 30e1  percentile  more often than not borrow  from only one
bank -their median number of lending banks is 1.5- in contrast to large-total-loans  firms of the
top 30h percentile borrowing  from 4 banks -their median number of lending banks is 3.7.  In
addition, small-total-loans  firms exhibit a high concentration  of their borrowing  among  lending
banks -with a Herfindahl  of 0.8- again in contrast  to large-total-loans  firms -with a Herfindahl
of 0.5. This proves,  therefore, that the intensity  of relationship  banking is generally  greater for
small-total-loans  firms.
As it happens,  borrowing  from multiple  lenders  and, thus, having a low concentration  of
loans  among  lenders  is more common  for firms  in larger loan size classes. But the link between
loan size class and our two proxies of relationship  banking is not a mechanic  one, as shown by
the ample  variability  within each loan size class. For instance,  some  of the firms  in the smallest
total loan size class borrow from 4 banks and have a Herfindahl  of 0.31, well below the average
for the largest  total loan size class. At the same time, some of the of the firms in largest  total
loan size class have a Herfindahl  of 0.09, well below the average  for the smallest  total loan size
class. Thus, the intensity  of relationship  banking  is, at least  partly, a choice variable  of each firm
that is affected  by other considerations  besides its borrowing  needs. Accordingly,  if we find that
the impact  of monetary  policy shocks differs according  to the intensity  of relationship  banking,
this doesn't depend  on firm size only.
17Table  5. Loan size, number  of lending  banks,  and Herfindahl  index
(average  values 1995-1999)
Range  Loan  Size  Number  of Lending  Banks  Herfindahl  Index  (H)
Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Max  Mean  Median  Min  Max
ith -
1,530"'  254.1  265.3  1.3  1.2  4.0  0.8  0.8  .308  1
1,531'h-
3,060'h  551.5  552.8  1.6  1.6  4.2  0.78  0.79  .282  1
3,061' -
4,590e'  780.2  777.9  1.9  1.8  5.0  0.8  0.8  .204  1
4,591  t-
6,122"'  1,048.8  1,395.1  2.1  2.0  7.0  0.7  0.7  .224  1
6,123" -
7,653"  1,395.1  1,391.0  2.3  2.2  5.4  0.7  0.7  .238  1
7,654'  -
9,183th  1,849.1  1,835.7  2.5  2.4  6.4  0.7  0.6  .254  1
9,184  -
10,713t'  2,494.8  2,485.4  2.8  2.6  7.6  0.6  0.6  .200  1
10,714'-
12,244"'  3,601.5  3,312.0  3.1  3.0  9.6  0.6  0.6  .172  1
12,245* -
13,774'  6,275.8  5,944.6  3.6  3.4  9.8  0.6  0.5  .170  1
13,775' -
15,305'h  54,992.0  18,680.0  5.1  4.6  18.8  0.5  0.5  .090  1
1) Loan  size is denominated  as million  Korean  Won.
4.2  Variable Selection and Summary Statistics
We use the following  variables:  (i) total loans outstanding;  (ii) amount  of collateral;  (iii)
loans  in arrears;  (iv) credit limits  outstanding;  (v) number  of lending  banks; (vi) Herfindahl  index
-as defined above- to measure  the concentration  of the firm's borrowing  among  lending  banks;
(vii) whether  the firm was borrowing  from one (or more) of the five banks foreclosed in June
1998.  Finally, we follow Petersen and Rajan (1994) in including 18 SIC industrial codes to
control  for industry-specific  effects."
18Table  6 presents a  detailed description  of the variables employed  in  our econometric
analysis.  Specifically, the focus of our exercise is on credit availability measures in 1997 -when
the crisis started- and in 1998 -when the crisis peaked.
Most of the variables need little explanation.  Provided firms in the sample are relatively
homogeneous in  size, total  loans outstanding  proxy their  degree of  indebtedness.  Thus the
changes in firm's  total loans (DTL9697, DTL9798) offer an indication of the changes in their
availability of credit.  The existence of loans in arrears (and their extent) may be associated with
situations of corporate distress (and with the extent of distress) and may, thus, reduce the supply
of credit.  So we expect  a  negative association between the  "Delinquency Dummy"  and  the
change in total loans.
Given  its  loans  outstanding,  a  larger  amount  of  collateral  offered by  a  firm  can be
interpreted as  signaling a  higher capacity  to  repay the  loans.  We  expect therefore  that  the
availability of credit increases with the amount of collateral.  The size of and  changes in the
credit  limits  outstanding  (DCL9697,  DCL9798)  -given  total  loans  outstanding-  may  be  an
important factor positively associated with the availability of credit to the firm.  This stems from
two distinct reasons.  First, credit limits outstanding indicate the degree to which a firm can rely
on  pre-committed credit  lines, which  reduce  the  risk of  incurring  into liquidity  shortages.'2
Second, as argued by Ferri and Kang (1999), since Korean banks'  credit lines are offered at no
charge -i.e. there is no commitment fee-  the undrawn part of the line may be thought of as an
option with zero price for the borrower.  Thus, the borrower is rationed  in the amount of her
credit limit, which is solely determined by the bank.  As such, outstanding credit limits provide a
measure of the availability of credit to the borrower because they are supply-determined.
19Next, we come to our proxies for the intensity of relationship banking' 3. Given the
amount  of loans  outstanding,  we can think of two distinct  proxies. First, we consider  the number
of  lending banks: we include it in  log form to  account for its  likely non-linear impact
(LNUMB96,  LNUMB97).  As described above, the extent of multiple banking is bound to
weaken relationship  banking. Thus, a negative (positive) link between the number of lending
banks and the availability  of credit will signify that relationship  banking  has a virtuous  (vicious)
effect reducing (increasing)  liquidity constraints. Second, given the number of banks a firm
borrows  from,  we consider  how such borrowing  is distributed  among  lending  banks. In case  the
firm's  borrowing were always uniformly distributed across lending banks, this  additional
dimension  would add no information. However,  it is possible  that some firmns  -though making
recourse  to multiple banking- concentrate  the bulk of their borrowing  at a single bank. In such
case, the firm could de facto be a "relationship  borrower"  even though it would be labeled as a
"non-relationship  borrower"  if we looked  at the number  of lending  banks only. Thus, we include
a variable  defined  as the product of the nunber  of lending banks with the Herfindahl index
(LNumb*H96,  LNumb*H97)  identifying the degree of concentration  of the firm's borrowing
among those banks. Our expectation  is that this variable should  have the opposite sign to that
obtained  for the number  of lending  banks.
Furthermore, in  determining whether the  extent of  relationship banking decreases
liquidity constraints, we  should be  extremely careful  to  control  for those  "relationship
borrowers"  that happened  to be associated  with banks that were hit by distress and were closed.
In such case, these borrowers  might be hit by the "curse" of relationship  banking in that it could
be extremely difficult for them to obtain liquidity support from banks they had no previous
acquaintance  with, especially during the financial crisis.  Accordingly,  our expectation is that
20credit availability will worsen particularly for firms borrowing from those banks that were
foreclosed  in 1998 (for which Exit = 1).  As a consequence  of this, it is possible  that some of
these firms became unable to service  their debt, thus cumulating  arrears  on their loans in 1998.
In addition,  we consider  two ramifications  of the effects  for borrowers  associated  with foreclosed
banks: i) whether  these borrowers  had a high collateralization  of their loans  (Exit*Collateral);  ii)
whether these borrowers had a high concentration  of their borrowing among lending banks
(Exit*H). Our expectation  is that: i) having a high collateralization  at foreclosed  banks should
definitely  be detrimental  to firms, and ii) the impact of Exit*H should be detrimental  for sure if
the firm concentrated  its borrowing  exclusively  at foreclosed  banks, but could even be beneficial
if the firm was also borrowing  from other surviving  banks. As to the first, in the crisis it may be
impossible  for customers  to re-deploy  their collateral  that is locked in with foreclosed  banks: to
the extent that some of these customers  were heavily dependent  on collateral,  they might be
worse off vis-a-vis borrowers  less dependent  on collateral. As to the second,  a higher H is a
"curse" for a firm exclusively  relying on foreclosed  lenders,  but might not be so if the firm was
also a  "relationship borrower" with other surviving banks, which could actually be more
forthcoming  to help it avoid  distress.
21Table  6: Variable  description
Variable  Deflintion
*  DTL9697,  DTL9798  Growth  in log  of total loans  during 1996-1997  and 1997-1998.
*  DWK9697,  DWK9798  Growth in log of working  capital loans during 1996-1997  and 1997-
1998.
*  LL95,  LL96  Log of total loans  in 1995  and 1996.
*  LNUMB96,  LNUMB97  Log of number of banks from which a frm  borrowed in the year of
1996  and 1997
*  LNumb*H96,  LNumb*H97  Interaction  term of LNUMB*H  (where,  H = Herfmdahl  Index)
*  Delinquency  Dummy  1996,  1997  Delinquency  Dummy  takes  a value I when  a firm has loans  in arrears
*  Collateral  Dummy  1996,  1997  Collateral  Dummy  takes a value I if the ratio of collateral  to total loans
is beyond  the 75t' percent  value.
*  DCL9697,  DCL9798  Changes  in the credit  limit  during  the year of 1996-97  and 1997-98.
*  Exit  Takes a value I if a firm maintained  lending  relationship  with those 5
banks  which  were foreclosed  during  the financial  crisis  (June 1998).
*  Exit*H97,  Exit*H98  Interaction  term of Exit dummy  and the Herfmdahl  index for the year
of 1997  and 1998.
•  ARR9897L  Takes a value I  if a firm was non-delinquent  in 1997 and became
delinquent  in 1998
*  ARR9897D  Takes  a value I if firm's delinquency  ratio rose during  1997  and 1998
*  Exit*  Collateral  Durmy 1997  Interaction  term of Exit and  Collateral  Dummy  of 1997
Table  7 contains  descriptive  statistics  of the variables  used later in the regressions. A few
remarks  concerning  the variables  are in order. First, the extent  of credit  contraction  during 1998
is demonstrated by  the noticeable reduction of total  lending during that year (DTL9798).
Second,  the fact that also banks' credit lines (DCL9798)  -arguably a proxy identifying  shifts in
the loan supply  (Ferri and Kang 1999)- dropped  sizably is consistent  with the hypothesis  that a
supply contraction  materialized. Third, the fact that the delinquency  dummy  reaches its highest
mean value for 1998  (0.258) confirms  the build up of non-performing  loans  and loans in arrears.
Fourth, we find that the mean value for collateral  raises  from 0.612 to 0.712 from 1996  to 1998.
22This seems to imply that banks reinforced  their standard  debt contracts  by increasing  collateral
requirement  to cope with adverse selection  and moral hazard problems,  presumably  heightened
during  the crisis.
Table 7: Summary  statistics
Variable  No. of  Mean  Median  Std.  Min.  Max.
Observations  Dev.
DTL9697  4,589  -.186  -.032  1.128  -7.715  5.860
DTL9798  4,589  -.485  -.209  1.165  -6.976  8.323
DWK9697  4,310  -.182  -.030  1.125  -7.595  5.525
DWK9798  4,194  -.509  -.211  1.165  -6.788  8.259
LL95  4,589  6.121  6.396  1.103  0  8.261
LL96  4,589  6.137  6.396  1.034  0  8.276
NUMB96  4,589  1.824  2  .965  1  8
NUMB97  4,589  1.856  2  1.008  1  9
LNUMB96  4,589  .478  .693  .485  0  2.079
LNUMB97  4,589  .491  .693  .492  0  2.197
LNUMMB98  4,589  .325  0  .436  0  1.792
LNumb*H96  4,589  .295  .353  .296  0  1.317
LNumb*H97  4,589  .292  .354  .288  0  1.261
LNumb*H98  4,589  .196  0  .261  0  1.223
Delinquency  Dummy  1996  4,589  .217  0  .413  0  1
Delinquency  Dummy 1997  4,589  .216  0  .412  0  1
Delinquency  Dummy  1998  4,589  .258  0  .437  0  1
Collateral  Dummy  1996  4,589  .612  1  487  0  1
Collateral  Dummy  1997  4,589  .589  1  .491  0  1
Collateral  Dummy  1998  4,589  .712  1  .452  0  1
DCL9697  3,114  -.047  0  .914  -5.523  4.517
DCL9798  3,143  -.217  0  .829  -5.967  6.477
Exit*H97  4,589  .0781  0  .225  0  1
Exit*H98  4,589  .0966  0  .272  0  1
ARR9897L  4,589  .084  0  .278  0  1
ARR9897D  4,589  .137  0  .344  0  1
Exit*Collateral  Dummy  1997  4,589  .0784  0  .268  0  1
234.3  Empirical analysis and main results
This  Section has  three  main  aims.  First,  we  test  whether  pre-existing  relationship
banking links helped firms to weather the financial crisis and to  safeguard themselves against
being liquidity constrained.  Second, we ascertain whether the reduction in the loan supply -
arguably proxied by  changes in lines of credit  which  are recognized as being more supply-
driven-  is larger for  firms  relying  less on  strong relationship banking.  Third, we  examine
whether pre-existing  relationship  banking  links  reduced  the  likelihood for  previously  non-
delinquent firms to build up loans in arrears in 1998, the very year firms experienced a severe
credit crunch.  As exposed above, in any of these specifications we control for customers of
foreclosed banks.
4.3.1  Relationship banking and the availability of credit: cross section evidence
We need to start with a caveat.  In our cross sectional estimations, the problem associated
with focussing on the changes in loans during the crisis period is that we can not  still be  sure
whether a supply-driven effect is effectively identified.  Namely, a firm experiencing a reduction
in loans could have issued bonds instead and the real cause of the loan contraction would be
demand reduction rather than supply reduction.  Nevertheless, this problem is mitigated by the fact
that we have dropped large loan firms and kept only small loan firms.  While we cannot rule out
that some of the small loan firms are in effect large firms with little leverage, we posit that the
large majority of the firms kept in our sample are bound to be SMEs with little access to financial
markets.  Thus,  we  can argue that,  by  examining  the  pattern  of  the  changes  in  total  loans
(DTL9697, DTL9798), we are effectively identifying a supply-driven effect.
Our results  are exposed  in  Table  8.  We document  that  the  intensity  of  pre-existing
relationship banking -measured by the log of number of lending banks (LNUMB)- is negatively
24associated with the availability  of credit.  Two observations are in point.  First,  this result  is
consistent with the potential benefits of relationship banking stated above and with the theory of
Thakor (1996) and Bulow and Shoven (1978) in the sense that the private information generated
by banks about firm with multiple sources of finance is less valuable to each bank.'4 Second, the
fact that the coefficient of LNUMB becomes larger in the estimate for 1998 is consistent with the
hypothesis that relationship banking becomes even more valuable as the crisis deepens.
Clearly, our evidence that intense relationship banking for  SMEs has value  during the
financial crisis  still  holds  after  controlling  for  firm  characteristics  such  as whether  they  are
delinquent, the extent of  their  collateral, and the  size of their credit  limits  outstanding.  The
negative coefficient of the pre-existing delinquency status -proxied  by the dummy variable that
takes value one when the firm has loans in arrears- correlates with the influence of the degree of
corporate distress on firm's  credit availability in the next period.  The coefficient of the collateral
dummy variable doubles and becomes significant for 1998: deepened information asymmetries in
the financial crisis  may require  firms to post  more collateral.  The fact that  contemporaneous
changes in credit limits (DCL) are very important determinants of DTL confirms that supply shifts
affect the availability of  loans.  The result that  DCL  becomes even more important for  1998
testifies that firms' reliance on pre-committed credit lines raised in the crisis period.
25Table 8: Cross section regressions
The dependent variable: The changes in the log of total loans (DTL9697, DTL9798)
Explanatoty  Variables  DTL9697  DTL9798
(1)  (2)
No.  of Observations  3,114  3,143
Constant  1.198  1.039
(4.98)***  (3.79)***
LL(t-2)  -.138  -.171
(-8.77)***  (-8.53)***
LNUMB(t-1)  -.139  -.219
(-1.98)**  (-2.86)***
Lnumb*H(t-1)  -.233  -.197
(-2.01)**  (-1.56)
Delinquency(t-1)  -.419  -.301
(-9.98)***  (-6.66)***
Collateral(t-1)  .052  .111
(1.57)  (2.99)***
Changes  in Credit  Limit(t)  .305  .460
(17.32)***  (21.14)***
Exit*H(t)  .187  -.138
(2.60)**  (-2.02)**
R-squared  .1886  .2202
1)  * , **, and ***  indicate statistical significance respectively at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels.  t-statistics appear in parentheses.
2)  18 industry dummies in accordance with two-digit SIC codes are included, but are not reported.
3) We have also examined the growth in log of working capital loans during  1996-1997 (DWK9697) and 1997-1998 (DWK979S) as a dependent
variable but we don't see any major difference.
The switching sign of the variable Exit*H from positive to  negative between  1997 and
1998 proves the consequences of the "curse" of relationship banking. Namely, this result gives us
two indications.  First, those firms concentrating -high  H- their borrowing at any of the five banks
foreclosed in  1998 enjoyed favorable treatment  in credit availability before the financial crisis.
Second, however, these very same firms fell into liquidity constraint during the crisis, confirming
that it was particularly difficult for them to substitute distressed lending banks during the financial
crisis.
26Finally,  the cross section  regressions  do not confirm  the expected  impact  of the interaction
term -product  of  the  number of  lending banks with  the  Herfindahl index (LNumb  *H96,
LNumb*H97)-  which is either insignificant  (for 1998) or significant  (for 1997) but with a sign
opposite to the predicted  one.  As we will see below, as expected,  this variable is a significant
positive determinant  of DCL and we cannot exclude  that the unexpected  sign of LNumb  *H here
depends  on including  it together  with DCL.
4.3.2  Relationship  banking  and the availability  of credit:  panel supply-driven  evidence
Although we focus on small loan firms only, changes in total loans might still be
contaminated by  demand-driven effects.  Therefore, we further address the  identification
problem by adopting  changes in lines of credit -a  more supply-driven  as well as relationship-
driven  variable' 5 rather than simple  changes  in the loans- as a dependent  variable.
As sketched above, in Korea, credit lines are offered to  qualified borrowers' 6 at no
charge, i.e. there is no commitment  fee.  This is different from the U.S. but similar to other
countries  e.g. Italy.  Borrowers pay the loan rate only on the part of the credit line which is
actually  drawn;  the remaining  part of the credit line bears  no cost. The undrawn  part of the line
may  be thought  of as an option with zero  price for the borrower  (Conigliani  et al. 1997,  Ferri and
Kang 1999). Given the lack of pecuniary cost in demanding  larger credit lines, firms have an
incentive  to demand credit lines as large as they can, in a way to cushion unexpected  liquidity
shocks. Thus, it is largely  the bank that determines  the credit limit, thereby  rationing  the amount
that would be demanded  by each borrower. Given the lack of pecuniary cost for the undrawn
part,  it would  also be particularly  difficult  to imagine  that firms ask that their lines be reduced  in
a period of tight liquidity.' 7
27In Table 9,  we look for a  general link between credit lines and the  intensity of
relationship  banking,  thereby  analyzing  this link over  both crisis  and non-crisis  periods  -from the
end of 1995 to end of 1999. Accordingly,  the natural method  we choose to do this is a panel
regression.  Panel estimation also enables us to  control for the pattern of macroeconomic
variables  such as inflation,  market  interest rates,  and changes  in industrial  productions.
Most  of the findings  are fairly consistent  with those of the cross section  regressions. The
negative  sign of the variable  Lnumb implies  that the drop in credit  lines is larger for firms relying
less on relationship  banking. The main difference  with the cross section  regression  is that here
the product  term LNumb*H exhibits the expected  positive sign, supporting  our conjecture  that
some firms  may  de facto be "relationship  borrowers"  even though they have multiple borrowers,
provided  they concentrate  the bulk of their borrowing  at one or a very few  banks.
The panel estimation confirms that firms borrowing from the five foreclosed banks
benefited  from easy access to credit  before the crisis  -the coefficient  of Exit is +0.081- but this
benign  effect  turned into a "curse" during  the crisis  -the coefficient  of Exit* Year  1998  is -0.175.
28Table 9: Panel regression
(1995 12.  - 1999. 12)
Dependent Variable:  Changes in Credit Lines
No. of Observations  6,936
Constant  1.085
(3.91)***
Log of Total Loans (t-I)  -.153
(- 1.04)**
Log of Credit Limit (t-1)  .013
(1.26)
Lnumb (t-1)  -.163
(-3.01)***
Lnumb*H (t-I)  .209
(2.35)**
Delinquency Dummy (t- 1)  -.079
(-2.11)**








Changes in Industrial Production  .001
(1  .95)*
Change in Interest Rates  .001
(4.93)***
Within = .0431
R-squared  Between = .0156
Overall = .0294
1) 18 industry  dummies  in accordance  with  two-digit  SIC codes  are included,  but are not reported.
2) * indicates  statistical  significance  at the 0.10 level; ** indicates  statistical  significance  at the 0.05 level; *** indicates  statistical  significance  at
0.01  level. t-statistics  appear  in parentheses.
294.3.3  Relationship banking and the probability of being delinquent
We use a  qualitative response  model to  estimate the probability that previously non-
delinquent firms will build up loans in arrears in  1998 as a function of a vector of independent
variables, X, and a vector of unknown parameters, 0.  The specific model we use is:
Pr(Yi = 1) = F[H(X , 0)] =
1  +e-Hi
where:
Yi is the dependent variable; F is the probability function, which has a  logistic functional
form, giving rise to the logit model:
M
Hij =  °o + E  8 jx  jj
j=l
Xi  is the vector of independent variables for the i-th individual firm; and 0 is the vector of
unknown parameters to be estimated.
We estimate two models.  In the first model the dependent variable (ARR9897L) takes the
value of  one if  a  firm was non-delinquent in  1997 and  became delinquent in  1998 and zero
otherwise.  In the second model, the dependent variable (ARR9897D) takes the value of one if
firm's  delinquency ratio rose during 1997 and 1998 and zero otherwise.
Table  10 comprises logit estimation results.  A positive (negative) coefficient in the logit
model indicates that an increase in the variable is associated with  an increase  (decrease) in the
probability of firms' delinquency (increase in its delinquency ratio).
The positive coefficient of Lnumb 1997 lends a strong support to the idea that more intense
relationship banking reduces the probability that a previously non-delinquent firm will build (or
30increase her) loans in arrears in 1998, the year of the sharpest liquidity constraints. 1 By the same
token, as the marginal significance of Lnumb*H  1997 shows, we  find some  evidence that the
probability was smaller for defacto  "relationship borrowers" -firms  concentrating their borrowing
at one or only a few banks though entertaining multiple banking relationship.
The negative sign of the collateral dummy, as expected, shows the typical role collateral
plays during the financial crisis to safeguard firms from distress.  For those firms borrowing from
one or more of the five banks foreclosed in June 1998, the probability of delinquency becomes
higher especially when a firm's  ratio of collateral to total loans is beyond the 75b percentile in
1997.  This implies that for a firm having its collateral already locked in at foreclosed banks it
becomes more difficult to replace distressed banks at a time when banks require more collateral to
cope with increased information asymmetries spawned by the financial crisis.
Finally,  we  find  no  evidence  that  those  customers  of  foreclosed  banks  with  high
concentration of their borrowing became more likely delinquent.  On the contrary, Exit*H is a
negative determinant of such probability.  The tentative explanation we can offer runs as follows.
To the extent that these customers were concentrating  their borrowing  also at other surviving
banks,  these banks might be  more forwarding to  assist them.  Unfortunately, this  is bound to
remain a conjecture since our database doesn't permit us to test such hypothesis.
31Table 10: Logit regressions
Explanatory Variables  ARR9897L  ARR9897D
No. of Observation  4,579  4,579
Constant  -4.307  -2.684
(-6.12)***  (-4.72)***
Log of Total Loans in 1997  .194  .043
(3.15)***  (1.10)
Lnumb 1997  .905  .876
(4.61)***  (5.01)***
Lnumb*H 1997  -.124  -.544
(-.35)  (-I1.75)*
Collateral Dummy 1997  -.473  -.840
(-4.06)***  (-8.87)***
Exit* Collateral Dummy 1997  .568  .522
(1.91)*  (2.09)**
Exit*H 1997  -.805  -.702
(-2.04)**  (-2.31)**
Pseudo R-squared  .0549  .0472
1) * indicates  statistical  significance  at the 0.10 level;  ** indicates  statistical  significance  at the 0.05  level;  *** indicates  statistical
significance  at 0.01  level. z-statistics  appear  in parentheses.
5  Conclusions
Is relationship  banking valuable in reducing  borrowers' credit constraints? Does such a
value increase  during financial  crises/monetary  squeezes? This paper has focused on these two
questions  and the deep 1997-98  Korean  crisis offered  us a unique  lab experiment  to answer  them.
32Using a special  database  of credit  bureau  micro-information,  we have provided  substantive
evidence  that relationship  banking does increase  credit availability  for SMEs  and that such role is
even more important  during  financial  crises. Though  we cannot  exclude  that relationship  banking
induces  rent extraction  on loan rates, its benefits  for credit  availability  seem  out of question.
Specifically,  we have drawn four main conclusions. First, loans plunged more for firms
with weaker pre-crisis  relationship  banking.  Second, also the drop in credit lines -arguably a
proxy identifying  loan supply shifts- was larger for firms relying less on relationship  banking.
Third, more intense relationship  banking reduced the probability  of firms' distress. Fourth, such
probability depended  on whether firms were borrowing from those banks foreclosed during the
crisis, proving  that it may be particularly  difficult for borrowers  to substitute distressed lending
banks during a financial  crisis.  All in all, our findings suggest that relationship  banking -with
surviving  banks- had a high value during  the Korean systemic  financial  crisis,  possibly staving  off
distress  and bankruptcy  for many viable SMEs.
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39Appendix  1
Average Firm  Size for each one of the 18 SIC groups  (Million  Korean Won, %)
Type  of Business  Average  Total Assets  Total  Assets
<Non-Manufacturing>
1.  Agriculture,  Forestry,  and Fishing  16,133  1,274,507  (0.17)
2.  Mining  10,721  2,455,171  (0.34)
3.  Electricity,  gas, and water  supply  1,165,851  39,638,917  (5.58)
4.  Construction  13,211  106,632,972  (15.03)
5.  Wholesales  and Retail  trade  6,994  85,941,295  (12.11)
6.  Hotel and  Restaurant:  34,872  5,614,522  (0.79)
7.  Transportation  and Communication
24,107  46,309,716  (6.52)
8.  Real Estate,  Renting,  and Business  activity
10,206  14,809,616  (2.08)
9.  Public  Administration,  Education,  Health,  and Social
Services  etc.  27,296  2,893,439  (0.40)
<Manufacturing>
1.  Food, beverage,  and tobacco  30,044  26,619,070  (3.75)
2.  Textile,  leather  12,230  42,365,405  (5.97)
3.  Wood,  Pulp,  paper,  publishing,  and  printing
13,188  16,630,189  (2.34)
4.  Refined  petroleum,  chemicals,  Rubber,  and plastic
43,523  79,822,061  (11.25)
5.  Non-metalic  minerals,  Basic  metals,  and Fabricated
metals  35,636  61,757,932  (8.70)
6.  Machinery  and Equipment  9,799  30,182,780  (4.25)
7.  Electric  and optical  33,013  69,658,090  (9.82)
8.  Transport  Equipment  70,855  72,272,616  (10.19)
9.  Furniture  etc.  7,039  4,364,323  (0.61)
Source: Financial  Statement  Analysis,  Bank of Korea (1997)
40' According  to the model  proposed  by Boot and Thakor  (2000),  interbank  competition  erodes  relationship  banking
while capital  market  competition  may enhance  it.
2  Ongena and Smith (2000) investigate  the determinants  of multiple-bank  relationships  using a sample of firms
across  twenty  European  countries. Controlling  for a variety  of firm-specific  characteristics,  they find that multiple-
banking is more  widespread  in countries  with inefficient  judicial systems  and poor enforcement  of creditor  rights as
well as in countries  with less  concentrated,  but stable,  banking  systems  and  active public  bond markets.
3 This interpretation  is consistent  with the results in Foglia, Laviola, and Marullo Reedtz (1998), that multiple
banking  relationships  are associated  with a higher  riskiness  of the borrowers.
4  Reeb and Kwok (2000) have recently challenged  this  common view.  They stress, in fact, the potential
shortcomings  associated  with lowering  the costs of fnancial distress  for firms associated  with main banks. While  a
firm in financial  distress  without  a mainbank  may be forced  to reduce investment  or sell assets  to a buyer who has a
higher  value,  this disciplinary  force  is weakened  for a firm with a mainbank. Thus, to firms with poor investment
opportunities,  the presence  of mainbanks  may actually  induce  an overinvestment  problem  and the reported  empirical
fimdings  are consistent  with  this idea.
5We  may  just note, in  passing,  that  interest  rate shocks  are normally  dominant  during  financial  crises.
6 For instance,  still on Japanese  data, Yamori,  and Murakami  (1999) show that the failure  of Hokkaido  Takusyoku
Bank significantly  lowered  the stock retuns of its client firms.
7  See, among others: Cho (1999); Domac, Ferri, and Kang (1999); Kim and Rhee (1999); Hahm and Mishkin
(1999);  Ferri and Kang  (1999); Krugman  (1998);  Corsetti,  Pesenti,  and  Roubini  (1999); Furrnan  and Stiglitz  (1998);
Caprio  (1998).
8 Foreign  Currency  Denominated  Debts  in  the Corporate  Sector:
(trillion  Korean  won)
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998
Extemal  Debt  15.82  16.99  21.73  28.81  42.85  75.52  54.00
Foreign  Currency  Loans  at  Domestic  Financial  14.73  14.45  18.50  23.18  29.81  49.92  44.47
Institutions
Total  Foreign  Currency  Debts  30.55  31.44  40.23  51.99  72.66  129.4  98.47
(2.9)  (27.9)  (29.2)  (39.7)  (78.0)  (-23.9)
Source:  Flow  of Funds Account, Bank  of Korea. Figures  in the parenthesis  are  the year-to-year  growth  rate.
419 Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Harhoff and Korting (1998) report that single relationships  dominate  among
small US and German firms, which may not always  be the case for small Italian  firms (Detragiache,  Garella,  and
Guiso, 2000).  Ongena  and Smith (1999) report that only a small fraction of large European  firms have a single
relationship.
10  The Herfmdahl  index  -the index of concentration  of lending  relationships-  is obtained  as the sum of the squares
of the incidence  of the loans granted  by each  bank to the firm  on the total indebtedness  of the same  firm.
Hi =  E g  m-
where,  j= firm  j (j=l,...,  15305);  i= bank i (i=l,... 18: 11  Nation-wide  commercials;  6 Locals;  and 1 Specialized
bank in business  as of end of 1999). Lji denotes  the loan  to firm  j from the bank i.
'1  Korean banks  often  use SIC codes in evaluating  borrower  quality,  and thus may impose  a higher lending  rate
premium  or even may not lend to firms in specific industries  in the case of financial  distress. For instance,  the
construction  sector -with its biggest size in terms of total assets among  the 18 sectors  (see the appendix 1)- was
frequently  referred  as being severely  subject  to bank's credit squeeze  during  the crisis  period.
12 Morgan  (1998)  shows  that  those bank loans  not made  under a commitment  slow  after tight monetary  policy, while
loans  under commitment  accelerate  or remain  unchanged.
13 Several authors use the number of banks from which the firm borrows as a measure of the intensity of
relationship  banking  (Petersen  and Rajan, 1994;  Cole, 1998).
14 Cole (1998) presents two reasons for this negative sign: i) free-rider  problems inherent in the sharing of
lending  information  reduces  the incentive  for banks  to extend loans;  ii) lower  quality  fiums  are forced  to shop  around
in order  to find  a lender  that will extend  credit.
15 Lines of credit may more often be relationship-driven,  whereas  mortgages,  equipment  loans, motor vehicle
loans,  and other  loans  may more  be transaction-driven  (Berger  and Udell, 1998).
4216 Credit  lines assigned  to each firm are restricted  as following  lending  categories:  commercial  bills discounted;
overdraft loans; general loans; and trade bills discounted. Methods  of determining  credit limits in each lending
items differ across banks.  In general, the following  variables  are considered:  i) duration  of the bank-customer
relationship;  ii) average  balance  of deposits,  commercial  bills, and trade bills; iii) credit ratings  of the borrower;  iv)
amount  of collateral  which  could be posted  with  the actual  credit  drawn;  v) borrowers'  balance  sheet  conditions;  and
vi) loan officer's  overall  judgement.
17 To be sure, although  credit  lines are offered  with  no pecuniary  cost and no collateral  to qualified  firms, the other
firms have the line at no pecuniary cost but are required  to post collateral. Accordingly,  since posting collateral
entails  a cost, the conjecture  that credit lines are strictly  supply-determined  might  not hold for this second  class of
firms. In any case, even for this second  class of firms, it seems  reasonable  to identify  reductions  in credit lines as
the result of banks' autonomous  decision. In fact, it is doubtful  that even these firms will ask to have their credit
lines  curtailed  at a time  of stringent  liquidity.
1'  This result may appear to be ambiguous  if banks have excessively  "evergreened"  their borrowers' credit.
Loan rollovers  keep borrowers  afloat, thereby  de facto non-performing  loans do not show up in arrears. But as
shown  in section  3, Korean  banks' willingness  of fresh lending  as well as renewed credit  bottomed  out in 1998  by
the impending  credit  crunch. Thus  the incentives  of banks' "evergreening"  was presumably  low.
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